Is Revenge Inherently Wrong?

Daniel Statman (University of Haifa)

 

Abstract
In liberal societies, revenge is often regarded as inherently wrong. This paper challenges that view by examining two candidate grounds for its impermissibility: its motivation and its consequences in terms of injustice or harm. Because acts of revenge are defined by their motivation, the most plausible objection is that this motivation is itself morally flawed. I reject various arguments that seem to support this objection and then do the same with the view that revenge is impermissible because it tends to produce retributive injustice or unjustified harm. The paper concludes that the permissibility of revenge is contingent and that recognizing a vengeful motive is a reason for caution, not for refraining from action.

Redner
Daniel Statman is a professor of philosophy at the University of Haifa and a senior fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute. He has already been a guest scholar at the research college twice, in winter 2013 and in spring 2023. His recent publications are War by Agreement: A Contractarian Ethics of War (Oxford University Press, 2019, with Yitzhak Benbaji), and State and Religion in Israel: A Philosophical-Legal Inquiry (Cambridge University Press, 2019, with Gideon Sapir).

Teilnahme
Geschlossene Veranstaltung. Kontakt: Beate Sutterlüty; E-Mail: b.sutterluety@forschungskolleg-humanwissenschaften.de